

A Short
DISCOURSE
UPON THE
DESIGNS,
PRACTICES & COUNSELS
OF
FRANCE.

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In a LETTER to a Friend.

LONDON,

First Printed in 1677. And now Reprinted for the Information of the present Times, Dec. 29. 1688. And are to be Sold by Randal Taylor near Stationers-Hall.

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A Short Discourse upon the Defect, Practices, and Designs of France.

1712.

YOU gave me a Brief, and a pertinent Deduction the other day of the *French Practices, and Designs*; the Progress of their *Army*, and the *Methoda* of their *Proceedings*: Together with a Scheme of the Inevitable Ruine and Slavery that threaten *Europe*, without a speedy, and a powerful Conjunction against them.

After this general Contemplation of the present State of *Christendom*; you were pleas'd to take a particular Prospect of the Interest of this *Nation*; and how far we are to reckon our selves concern'd in the common Calamity: Coming at last to this Conclusion, that *England* cannot reasonably expect to stand long, after the Loss of *Holland and Flanders*. For the support of this Opinion, (besides the Force of your own Reasoning) you refer'd me to several Historical, and Political Treatises upon the subject; which I have diligently examin'd, and made use of, in this following Discourse; wherein I take the Freedom to give you my Thoughts upon the whole matter.

Your first Charge upon the *French*, was, *Breach of Faith*: and you pitch'd upon the Cases of *Spain*, and *Portugal*; the barbarous usage of the *Duke of Lorain*; and the Nulling of the most *Christian Queens* *Re-nunciation* upon Marriage, (which was the very foundation of the *Spanish Treaty*) by a pretended revocation of the *Spanish Netherlands*, in the sight of that *Assembly*: Their underhand tampering of *Denmark*, and *Sweden*, to draw the One from us, and hinder the Other from joining with us; the Influence they had upon our Disgrace at *Clashew*; Their playing Booty on both sides, betwixt *England* and *Holland* in the *Dutch War*; And to these Instances, (which are all so notorious that they need no expounding) you might have added a thousand more of the like Quality. But these may suffice for a reasonable, and necessary Caution, and without the Helps of Aggravation and Clamour; especially that extraordinary Action of destroying the *Queens Renunciation*, and then invading the *Spanish Netherlands* upon her. An Action hardly to be paralleld in the Story of the whole World, for a continuance of so many enormous Circumstances. There was in it the Publick Faith of the two *Crowns*; which is the only security of Government, and the Bond of Humane Society: There was in it the Splendour of an *Oath*; at the very Altar; which is the most Sacred Tye of a *Christian*: There was also

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the highest Profession, and assurance of Friendship imaginable; which is accounted one of the most binding Obligations betwixt Man and Man. And then there was a Brother, a Cousin, and an Infant, in the Case; which makes it matter of Humanity and Honour. And yet all these Cords were as easily broken as Bulrushes. This single President may serve, however, for a warning to all Princes and States, not to leave themselves at the mercy of men of such Principles. But His most Christian Majesty is not the only Prince that has been abused by Corrupt, and Ambitious Ministers.

Your next Observation was, that they are the greatest intermediers in the World, in other Peoples Affairs; that they embroyl all wherever they come; and that there's hardly any Rebellion, but they are in the bottom of it. For their Money walks in all the Courts and Councils of Christendom; nay, and beyond it too: For 'tis said, that the last Grand Visir was their Pensioner. Was it not France that debauch'd Scotland first; and afterwards England, into the late Rebellion? Nay, did they not stand still, and look on, to see the Crowning of the work which they themselves began, in the Execrable Murther of the late King? And did they not refuse to our Gracious and persecuted Sovereign — even a Retreat in their Dominions? How did they prolong the War in Portugal? What Havock have they made in Poland, and what work in Hungary? And are they not at this day in Counsel with the Port against the Empire, and undermining the Bullwark of Christendom? How have they dash'd England against Holland; blinded the Eyes of several Princes of the Empire; and baffled all Mediations towards a General Peace? Did they not formerly, under the Colour of protecting Germany, cut off Alsacia from the Empire? And in a word, this has been their practice wheresoever they have come: They Cover Harbours in Spain, (says the admirable Baron del' Isola) Leagues in the Empire; Factions in Poland; Wars in England and Holland; Passes into Italy; and the Sovereign Arbitrage every where. Their Quarter consists in the Trouble of all others, and their Advantage is in the Publick Calamities. Nor have they any other way, then by dividing, and weakening of the parts, to master the whole, which is the Capital design. And if so, There's no Fence against a Common Enemy, but a Common Union.

It is already made appear, by what is above said, how dangerous they are to mankind. The next hint you gave me, was to consider on't, whether the English may reasonably expect any better Quarter from them, then other People: in which point, I shall only lay the matter before you, and leave you the Judge on't.

The Four main Interests of a Nation, are, Religion, Reputation, Peace, and

and Trade. For the best of these, we shall neither fare the better, nor the worse: but lose just as much for being of another Communion, as his *Catholic Majesty* gains by being of the same. The Question now on Foot is a Communion of State, not of Faith. The *Alcoran*, and the *Gospel* go hand in hand; and at the same time, the *Protestants* are protected in *Hungary*, and persecuted in *France*. To say nothing of the Encouragements they give there to the *Jansenists*, which may, for ought we know, prove the greatest Blow to the Church of *Rome* that ever it received since the Reformation. But what do I talk of Religion, in a Cause that is dipp'd in *Christian Blood*, and in the Tears of *Widows and Orphans*? A Cause that is propagated by *Sacrilege, Rapes, Depopulation, Slavery, Oppression*, and at least a Million of *Lives sacrificed to it already*? The very thought of it is enough to strike the Soul of any man with horror and Indignation.

If you would see now how tenderly they have handled us in the Business of *Reputation*: Pray do but cast an Eye upon the Character of an *English man* in their *Politique de France*.

Quant à ce qui est des Anglois, ils n'ont aucuns amis, ce sont des gens sans Foy, sans Religion, sans Probité, sans Justice aucune, desians, legers au dernier point, Cruels, Impatiens, gourmands, Superbes, audacieux, avares, propres pour les coups de main, et pour une prompte execution, mais incapables de conduire une Guerre avec jugement. Leur Pais est assez bon pour vivre, mais il n'est pas assez riche pour leur fournir les moyens de sortir, & de faire aucune conquête: aussi n'ont ils jamais rien conquis, excepte L'Irlande, dont les habitans sont fobiles, et mauvais Soldats, &c. i. e. As for the English, they are a People without Friends, without Faith, Religion, Honesty, or Justice; Distrustful and fickle to the highest degree imaginable: Cruel, Impatient, Gluttonous, Proud, Audacious; they will do well enough for a Rubber at Cuffs, or a sudden Exploit, but they underst and nothing at all of the Government of a War. The Country is passable enough for them to live in; but not Rich enough to offer at any Conquest abroad; nor did they ever make any, but upon the Irish, which are a weakly people, and ill Soldiers.

I think it were not amiss in this place, to desire our Impertinent Undertaker to turn back to the History of *Philip de Valois*, and he shall there find that our *Edward the third* made a shift with one Army to beat 60000 French, and leave betwixt thirty and forty thousand of them upon the place; and with another Army in the Bishoprick of *Durham* to defeat as many Scots, and cut off 15000 of them too. And it must not be here omitted, that this *Scotch Army* was also animated by *French Counsels*. I would not willingly run out a Letter into a Volume, so that all other Reflections apart, I shall only add, that if the English had not once recovered the Field, and another time made it good in two of the greatest Actions of late that have yet passed betwixt the *Imperialists*, and the *French*, 'tis the

Opinion of wise men, That the latter would not have had much to brag of upon the success of this War. And this in some degree is acknowledged by the Author of a *French Relation of the Actions Versus the Irish* in 1673, 1676, and 1677, (how Romantical! never in other Cases.) Speaking of the Battle under the command of the *Comte de Lorge*, after the Death of the *Vicomte Turenne*, these are his words, *Et d rendre justice aux Anglois, et aux Irlandois, on peut dire, qu'on leur doit une bonne partie de cette victoire*; That is to say, And to give the English and Irish their due, France is indebted to them in a large measure for this Victory. But now to our Politician again, *Ils se haïssent les uns les autres, et sont en division continuelle, soit pour la Religion, soit pour le Gouvernement*. The English, says he, hate one another, and are still quarrelling, either about Religion or Government.

These Indecencies would almost make a man call them Names; but let us pass without one Angry word, from the Interest of our Reputation, to that of our Peace. And enquire how they stand affected to us upon that point. To say, that England has not for a long time had any troubles either at home, or abroad, which the French have not promoted, or improv'd to their own Advantage; is to say no more then that they deal with Us as they do with all the World beside; So that we must e'en have recourse again to their *Politiques* for some particular mark of their Favour, where you shall find that our State-Mountebank has not yet shewn all his Tricks, but puts himself with a very grave and fore-casting Countenance upon the very Project of our Ruine. *Une Guerre de France, de trois ou quatre ans contre eux les ruinerà entierement, ainsi il semble qu'il ne faut point faire de paix avec eux qu'à des Conditions qui nous soient très-avantageuses*. A War (says he) of three or four years with France, would absolutely destroy the English; so that methinks we should not entertain any Peace with them, but upon very profitable terms. And then a little after. In fine, says he, the way to undo the English, is to make them keep an Army on foot; and there's no fear of their Landing in France, but to their certain destruction, unless they should be invited by a Rebellion; without which, their Troops will in a short time most undoubtedly fall foul one upon another. To keep them upon continual Expence, 'tis but giving them the Alarm upon the Isles of Jersey, and Guernsey, Wight, and Man, Ireland, and the Cinque-Ports; by which means, they will be put upon the Charge of Fortifications and Garrisons, which will persuade the People that the King intends to set up a standing Army, and an Arbitrary Government. So long as this holds, the Nation will never be at quiet, but torment themselves with fears, and Jealousies, which may be easily fomented by letters in Cipher, to such or such particular persons; and in such sort to be intercepted as shall be found convenient. These Letters may give a Hint of a Descent in Ireland, and elsewhere, which would dispose the Irish, who mortally hate the English, to a Revolt; and among the suspect-

the *Adels* take they would pass for Gospel. The *Catholics* would make the *Sects* also to believe themselves of enjoying their Liberty; whom there must be Parties made, and the *Sects* encouraged one against another; especially the *Roman Catholics*, must be fairly hand'd, and private Assurance given (in the Name of the King of England) to the *Benedictines*, (who are easy enough to be impos'd upon) that they shall be restor'd to all their former Benefits, according to the Priviled *Monasticon*; which will presently make the *Roman Catholics* declare themselves; and the *Adels* will move Heaven and Earth for the bringing of matters about: But then Care must be taken to carry on the Report that the King is of the *Romish Religion*; which will distract the Government, and throw all into an Absolute Confusion.

From hence we may gather; first, what opinion the French have of us: Secondly, that it is not only their desire and study, but a form'd design to enshroud us: Thirdly, that they will stick at nothing neither, to compass that end; be it never so foul: Fourthly, this Libeller has trac'd us out the very methods of their working: As by amusing the People with forged Letters of Intelligence, where the first Author of the Plot must miraculously discover it: By filling the Peoples heads with fears and Jealousies; and leaving no stone unturn'd in England, Scotland, and *Wales*, to stir up a Rebellion: Why has he not advis'd the Poisoning of all our Fountains too? which would have been a Course of as much Christianity and Honour. But that this Trifler may not glorify himself too much in his wondrous Speculations, take notice, that he is only the Transcriber, not the Author of this goodly Piece, for the Original was betwixt Richieu and *Macarini*; and it amounts to no more in effect, than an imperfect History of the French dealings with us for a long time, and particularly in our late Troubles.

To come now from his most unmannerly Malice, to his Reason of State; If I am not mistaken, England might longer subsist in a War with France, than France could in a Peace within it self (the heaviest of all Judgments, when a Nation must be wicked upon necessity:) And again, when he says that England cannot buy France by a Defect, unless it all do by a Rebellion; he never considers that if England had an Army as foot and stood inclin'd to make use of it that way, we should not be long without our Invasion. For we see what the *Bourdeaux*, &c. did upon their own Bottom, and without any Foreign Encouragement; and the whole business misadvised only for want of vigorous Seconding: dauntly give me leave to say that he has extremely overshot himself in one thing more; for though this has been really the practice of the French, and is at this day the very Model and Rule by which their *Emissaries* govern themselves; it should yet have been kept as the greatest Secret in the World: for the owning of these

Inglorious.

Inglorious Artificers in publique, makes it one of the Grossiest Libels that ever was written against the French Government: to say nothing of his oversight in disobliging the *Roman Catholics*, and laying Snarcs to Trepan them.

The question of *Trade* has been so beaten already, that there remains Little to be added to it. Nor in truth needs it, since it is agreed at all hands, that the French set up for an *Universal Commerce* as well as for an *Universal Monarchy*. And in effect, the one is but a necessary consequent upon the other. Nor is it enough, it seems, for us to be design'd upon by them, without lending them our hands towards the cutting of our own Throats: For upon a sober and judicious estimate, we are Losers by our Trade with France, at least a Million and an half per Annum. I shall conclude this Head with one passage more out of our *Politiques of France*: (And you'll say 'tis a pleasant one too, but it must be under the Rose) Upon a Pre-supposal of mischief that's a Brewing in England, Now, says he, it will be our business to renew our Alliance with Holland; we can wheedle them into an Opinion, that they are the only men that understand the knack of Trade; so that they shall have that to themselves; the Talent of the French, alas! lies another way; and there's no forcing of anything against Nature: and that now's their nick of time, to crush their Competitors for the Northern Seas. So that we are all of us to be served with the same Sauce; but 'tis some degree of Honesty yet, when they tell the World what they are to trust to.

Now to sum up all that's said. If the French can dispence with Oaths, and Solemn Contrasts; If it be their Custom, and a Branch of their Policy, to fish in troubled Waters; If they hate us, as English-men, and are not for us, as Reformed Catholics; If they do all they can to wound us, in our Reputation, our Peace, and our Trade, we may take for granted that they will destroy us to all purposes if they can, which naturally leads me to an Enquiry how far we are in their Power, or likely so to be, that we may take our measures accordingly.

It will not stand with the Brevity I propose in this Paper to give you a Geographical, or an Historical Account of Places, or Alliances: But in as few words as I can, I am to present you with a general view of the present State of *Christendom*, with a regard to the Power of France; and then to consider how far England may come to be concern'd in the Common Fate. Here it was that you and I brake off in our last Discourse. So that in the Prosecution of it, I must try to walk without Lugging, (Saying only the helps that I have gathered from certain Tracts which I have read, upon his Recommendation) wherein I shall steer a middle Course, betwixt some that overvalue the Strength of France, and others that will have it to be less than indeed it is.

That

That the Arms of *France* are at this day formidable to all *Christendom*, is not to be denied, and *Tartius* gives you the reason of it, in the Case of the *Romans* and the *Britanni*, *Baras* (says he) *ad propulsandum commune Periculum conventus: ita, dum singuli pugnant, universi vincuntur*. There must be a common force to oppose a common danger; they struggled one by one, till they were all destroyed. The *French* (no doubt of it) are a wealthy, a populous and a Military Nation. But it must be allowed that they are more indebted for their Greatness, to the slips and oversights of others, (And this without disparagement too) then they are to their proper Conduct and Valour. The advance they made into *Flanders* in 1667. was introduced by the *Spaniards* trusting to their Assurances of Friendship, and rather imputable to an excess of Charity than any want of Precaution; though it seemed not very likely that they should march with Horse, Foot and Cannon, only to go a birding. Through these and the like Arts they have rais'd themselves to that dangerous height where now we behold them; taking all advantages of the unfeeling condition of *Spain*; the divisions of the Empire, the Factions in *Holland*, and of all other mistakes in point of foresight and Resolution elsewhere. You know very well, the Conquests they have made upon the *United Provinces*, the *Spanish Netherlands*; a considerable part of *Germany* with the Terror and Devastation that accompanies them every where: The Progress of their Arms in *Catalonia*, *Sicily*, the *West-Indies*, &c. Now what may be the consequences of this over-growing Power, and how to prevent them, is the matter in Question.

AS it is without dispute, that the *French* aim at *Universal Dominion*, (which is only a more plausible Cover for that *Universal Slavery* which must create it) so is it accounted as indubitable a Principle, that the Conquest of *Flanders* must be the Foundation of it. And according to this Maxim it is, that they take their Measures; for they have made themselves Masters of the Outworks already, in *Valenciennes*, *Gambray* and *St. Omer*; three places of very great strength and importance: And it is generally believ'd by the recalling of their Troops from the *Rhine*, and bending the flower of their Force that way, that they will push for the rest this Campaign. If they carry it, (as probably they will, without the speedy addition of some powerful Alliance) take notice I beseech you of that which Naturally follows. In the first place, the Charge and the Hazard of that War is over, which in Garrisons, and in the Field, has put his most Christian Majesty to expence of keeping near 100000 Men in Pay: (which will then be at liberty to fall in upon the Empire.) Beside,

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what has been expended in *Management*, as the French call it, which in honest English is down right *Corruption*. Secondly, This Acquisition will furnish the French King with men and monies, for an Army of fifty thousand Men, (and no better Souldiers in Europe.) Thirdly, what will become of the Duke of *Brandenburg*, if the French shall fall into *Cleves*, and *Mark*, with a matter of forty or fifty thousand Men more, and from thence into *Pomerania*, and *Prussia*? Fourthly, the whole Patrimony of the *Empire*, from the *Rhine* to the Frontiers of *France*, fall by an inevitable Consequence into the hands of the French, as they have already swallowed the three Bishopricks of *Metz*, *Toul* and *Verdun*. So that the Imperial Army will be forc'd over the *Rhine*, and there probably kept in play, and upon the bare defensive, by the Princes of the French Interest; while in the mean time, the Princes of *Westphalia* will be reduc'd to an absolute necessity of ranging themselves under the French Protection and Changing their party. And what can then be expected from *Holland*, after what they have suffer'd already, and under their present despairs, but to content themselves with such Conditions as *France* will give them? For after the loss of *Cleves* and *Flanders*, their Case is wholly desperate, unless *England* should vigorously interpose to their Relief. And the State of the *Empire* is neither better nor worse than that of their Neighbours; for they must all submit their Necks to the same Yoke. When matters are brought to this Pass, they have before them, *England*, *Spain* and *Italy*; the Cloud is gathered already, and it is wholly at their Choice where it shall break.

There are a great many people, I know, that promise themselves mighty things from the Event of another *Campaign*, for want I fear of Consulting the Chart, and the almost insuperable difficulties that lie in the way; The means they propose, are either by carrying the War into *France*, by way of *Revalfian*, or by forcing the French upon a *Capital Battle*. The former Proposition seems not very impracticable; and secondly, of little or no advantage, if it could be effected. It must be considered that beyond *Metz*, *Coblentz* and *Treves*, the Imperialists have no Magazine at all beside that betwixt *Treves* and *France* (a part of *Luxembourg* excepted) is absolutely in the Enemies Power. Now how should an Army subsist there, that must over and above, pass through a Country of about twenty Leagues, that is wholly laid waste, and in Ashes, and without any Castle in it, or any other sort of Necessary provision?

Put the Case now that the Imperialists should break through all these difficulties, and carry an Army even into the *Lorain* it self, the Country of *Metz*, or *Burgundy*, (which would take them up the best part

part of a Summer too) all the strong holds are in the hands of the *French*, and the Country laid so desolate, that there's no living for an Army there. When this comes to this, they must resolve either upon a *Battle* or *Siege*. If the former, The *French* are at liberty whether they will fight, or no, and there's no compelling of them; for they are among their strong holds; and all's their own both behind them, and on each side; and the Country either burnt or deserted. But carry it farther yet, and suppose the *French* forc'd up on the Risk of a *Battle*. First, The *Imperialists* are not sure to get the better of it. And Secondly, What if they should? Nay to the degree of an entire Victory? All that would be expected more for that year, would be only to take in some considerable Post, and make good the ground they had gotten for the next Campaign. For it would be a madness to pursue their Victory into the heart of an Enemies Country, and leave so many strong Garrisons upon their Backs, which would undoubtedly cut off all their Convoys and starve them.

But this is still the supposing of a Thing not to be supposed; for the *French* in this Case, would stand upon the Defensive, and not to come to a *Battle*. Or in case they should, and be worsted; they have men enough in Garrison for Recruits, that would immediately reinforce them.

Now on the other side, what if the *Imperialists* should chance to be routed? The Garrisons which the *French* hold in *Larissa*, *Burgundy* and *Alfusa*, would in such Case, totally destroy that broken Army, and cut out such work in *Germany*, as has never been known in the *Empire* for many Ages.

In this extremity, let us suppose that the *Empire* should yet bring another Army into the Field; and try the issue of a Second *Battle*, and misery. And that the disaffected Princes of the *Empire*, should declare themselves for the Enemy; all that part of *Germany* that lies within two or three days journey of the *Rhine*, would be irrecoverably lost; a great part of it being so harassed already, that tis not able so much as to furnish an Army upon a March, much less for a Winter quarter.

Now to the Business of a *Siege*, the *French* have taught us, by *Philippe* and *Metz*, that they want neither Skill to besiege a place, nor Courage to defend it. So that without a great loss of Time and Men, it cannot be expected that the *Imperialists* should make themselves Masters of any considerable place: And when they shall have carried it, what will a Town in *Lorraine*, or *Burgundy*, signify to the favour of the *Spanish Netherlands*, which if once lost, are hardly to be retriev'd?

Now taking this for granted, if *England* does not step in with all the speed and vigor imaginable, see what will be the end on't. First, That the *French*, being Masters of all the Posts, Passes and strong-holds in *Lorain* and *Burgundy*, may dodge and trifle the *Imperialists* at pleasure; and make them spend out the year without any Advantage to the *Netherlands*. The way would have been for the *Imperialists* to have prest with an Army of 50000 men directly into the body of *France*, and the *Confederate Troops* in the *Low Countries*, to have made another Inroad by the way of *Picardy*, or *Bologne*; but since the taking of *Valenciennes*, *Gambray* and *St. Omer*, there's no possibility of piercing *France* that way. So that a very small Army now upon the *Spanish Netherlands*, with the help of the *French* Garrisons, is sufficient to amuse and tire out the whole force of *Spain*, and *Holland* upon that Quarter.

Secondly, *France* being thus secur'd on that side will unquestionably fall in with all their Power upon the *Empire*; unless diverted by the Alarm they have now receiv'd from *England*. Now admitting this to be the Condition of *France*, let any man of sense judge, what good the *Imperial* Army can do to the *Netherlands* (upon which single point depends the Fortune of *Christendom*.) What if they should march up to the Borders of *France* with 50000 men? Will not the *French* encounter them there with as many, or more? And with this odds too, that the *Imperialists* suffer a thousand Incommodities in their March, through a ruin'd Country; whereas the *French* have good Quarters, and plenty of all things at hand, watching the Others motions and improving all Advantages against them.

Thirdly, In this posture of Affairs, the *Confederates* must never expect to do any great Matter upon the *French*, in these Provinces, unless they do very much out-number them.

And it is likewise to be considered, that these troubles falling out in the Minority of his *Catholic Majesty*, the distractions of that Government, the Revolt of *Sicily*, and great disorders upon the Frontiers of *Spain*; the *Netherlands* have been much neglected, all the Elevation of his Highness *Don Joan of Austria* to the dignity of *Prime Minister*. And that it is not possible for him, by reason of the many Exigencies of that Crown nearer home, to send any Considerable succour to the *Low Countries*, otherwise than by supplies of Money. So that by that time the *Imperialists*, and the *Hollanders* are got into their Winter-Quarters, or at least, before they take the Field again, the *French* from time to time will be ready with Fresh Troops out of their Garrisons to prosecute their Conquests; which by degrees must needs break the hearts of the Poor Inhabitants, when they find that

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neither their Faith, nor their Courage, is able any longer to protect them. And when that day comes; what by their Armies, and what by other Influences, the *French* will have as good as Subjected two thirds of *Europe*. And there will also occur these farther difficulties. First, no body knows where the *French* will begin their Attaque; which will oblige the *Spaniard* and *Hollander* to strengthen all their Garrisons as far as their Men will reach. Secondly, when the *Spanish* and *Holland* Troops shall be so dispers'd, wheresoever the *French* sit down, they must then give themselves for lost, for want of an Army to relieve them; beside their furious and obstinate manner of Assault, for they care not how many men they lose, so they carry the place. (And then most of the Men too are made Prisoners of War.) Nor is the season of the year any discouragement to them neither; witness their first Irruption into *Burgundy*, and the restless Activity of their Troops even at this Instant.

So soon as their Work in *Flanders* is over, (which only *England*, under Heaven, is able to Prevent or Check) the *French* will have an Army of at least 50000 Men about *Lorain*, *Luxemburg*, and *Burgundy* to face the *Imperialists*; and at the same time with as many more perhaps they will seize upon the Dutchy of *Juliers*, and of *Cleves*, and from thence pass the *Rhine*, to countenance those that are of the *French* Caball, on the side of *Westphalia*; and so in due time, several other Princes of the *Empire*. It is remarkable that in three years War against the *Confederates*, his most *Christian Majesty* has not only stood his ground, without losing so much as one Inch of his Ancient Patrimony, but actually and almost without opposition, taken several Towns, and some entire Provinces, from the Principals of the *Confederacy*; And made himself almost as Considerable at Sea, as he is at Land; Not only in the *Mediterranean*, and upon the Coasts of *Spain* and *Italy*, but in *America* too: where he has laid a Foundation of great mischief both to *England* and *Holland*, in the point of *Commerce*; if not timely prevented. And he does little less by his *money* than by his *Arms*; for he pays all, and with *French* money, under pretext of *Neutrality*, maintains considerable Armies in the very heart of the *Empire*; which, 'tis feared, will be ready enough upon any disaster, to joyn with the *Common Enemy*. It is the *French* Court that manages the Counsels of *Poland*, and they govern the *Swiss* no less; who, by the Conquest of the *Franche County* are made little better than slaves. And yet by a fatal blindness that *Republique* still furnishes the *French* with the best of their Soldiers, and helps forward the destruction of *Europe*, never dreaming that they themselves are to be undone too at last.

But

But it is no great matter, you'll say, to impose upon the *Swisse* (which are a heavy and Phlegmatick people) but the *French* charms have bewitcht even *Italy*, it self; though a Nation the most Clear-sighted, and suspicious of all others. For their *Républiques* lie as quier, as if they were asleep; though the Fire is already kindled in *Swiss*, and the danger brought home to their own doors. It is a wonder, that they lay things no more to heart, considering, *first*, the Passages that the *French* have to favour their Entry. *Secondly*, that they are many, and small States; weak, and easily to be corrupted, if not so already. *Thirdly*, That though they have been formerly very brave, and many Particulars remain so still, yet in the generality they are soft and Effeminate. And *Fourthly*, That the *French* is there the Master of the Seas. These Reflections methinks might convince any man of the condition they are in. And certainly they that were not able to defend themselves against *Charles the Eighth*, will be much less able to encounter *Lewis the 14th*: Or if he gets in, to drive him out again, as they did the Other. For they must do it wholly upon their own Strength, having only the *Turk* in condition to help them. For *Germany* and *Spain* are sunk already, And the *Swisse* will neither dare to venture upon, nor are they able to do it if they had a mind to't.

As for *Spain*, it is neither Populous, nor fortify'd, and perhaps want of Provisions may keep it from an Invasion. And yet for all that, with a Body of Thirty or Forty thousand Men by the way of *Fontaraby*, and as many by *Catalonia*, the *French* may (if they please) in two Campaigns make themselves Masters of *Navarre*, *Aragon*, *Catalonia*, and *Valencia*: and then it is but fortifying the Frontiers, and making his *Catholic Majesty* a Tributary in *Castile*; Who must content himself to take what they please to give him, over and above, in consideration of his Dominions in *Italy*, and the *Spanish Indies*: A Possibility that *England* and *Holland* shall do well to think of: For when he has the Mines in his Power, and Europe under his Feet, there will be no contending.

After this, they have only the *Swisse*, or the *English*, to fall upon next: For the *Former*, they are neither fortify'd nor united in Affections or Religion.

As for *England*; They are a People not naturally addicted to the *French*, sensible of their Honour, and of their Interest; and the whole World is convinced of their Courage. They are United under the Government of a Gracious Prince; and their Concerns are at this Instant lodged in the hands of the Most Loyal and Publick-spirited Representatives that ever acted in that Station; beside the strength of the Island by Situation: So that the *French* would find it a hard matter,

ten, either to make a Conquest here, or, if they should surprize it, to keep it. But yet they have finer ways to Victory than by Force of Arms; and their *Gold* has done them better service than their *Iron*.

What have we now to do then, but in a Common Cause, to arm against a Common Oppression? This is the time, or never, for *Italy* to enter into a League for their Common Safety, and not only to keep, but, if possible, to force the *French* from their Borders; while the *Imperial Army* holds the Capital Power of *France* in Play.

And this is the time too, for the *Swiss* to recall all their Troops out of the *French Service*, and to Strike a general League also for the Recovery of *Burgundy*, the only Outwork of their Liberties, and to expel the *French Garrisons*, and deliver the places into the hands of the Right Owners.

And will it not concern *Poland* as much as any of the rest, that stands falls with the *Empire*, as the Defence of *Christendom* against the *Turks*, and whose own Turn is next?

This Alarm methinks should call off the Princes from the Acquisitions they have made upon part of the *Swedes* Possessions in the *Empire*, to the Assistance of the *Spanish Netherlands*; and make all the *French Ambassadors* in the *Empire* to bethink themselves of returning from the delusions which either the *French Artifice* or *Money* has imposed upon them. He that has no regard for the *Head*, will have less for the *Dependence*, when he has them at his Mercy.

Nay the very *French* themselves should do well to contemplate the Slavery that is now prepar'd for them. Their Laws and Liberties are trampled upon; and till the *French Government* be reduc'd to the Bounds of its *Ancient Constitution*, neither the *People*, nor their Neighbours, can ever be secure.

In this dangerous Crisis of Affairs, it has pleas'd Divine Providence to leave *England* the Arbitress of the Fate of *Europe*; and to annex such advantages to the Office, that the *Honour*, the *Duty*, and *Security* of this Nation seem to be wrapt up together. In the Point of *Honour*, what can be more Generous, than to succour the Miserable and the Oppress'd, and to put a stop to that Torrent that threatens *Christendom* with an Universal Deluge? Beside the Vindication of our selves for those Affronts and Indignities, both Publick and Private, that we have suffer'd upon our own Account. And then in matter of *Duty*: It is not only *Christendom*, but *Christianity* it self, that lies at stake. For in the Ruine of the *Empire*, the *Turks* work is done to his hand, by breaking down the only Fence that has preserv'd us all this while from the incursions of the *Ottoman Power*. Now as nothing can be more Glorious, than

then at all hazards, to hinder the Effusion of more Blood, than
 to save *Christendom* it self from Bondage: It is so much our Interest, that
 we our selves are Lost without it. And as the Obligation is Reciprocal,
 to the Resolution is necessary: The choice we have before us being
 only This, *Either to unite with our Neighbors for a Common safety, or to
 stand still and look on, the same Spectators of their Ruine, till we fall alone.* This
 is so Demonstrative, that if we do not by a powerful Allyance, and Di-
 version, prevent the Conquest of *Flanders* (which lyes already a gasping)
 we are cut off from all Communication with the rest of *Europe*; and
 coop'd up at home, to the Irrecoverable loss of our Reputation and Com-
 merce; for *Holland* must inevitably follow the Fate of *Flanders*, and then
 the French are Masters of the Sea; Ravage our Plantations, and infal-
 libly possess themselves of the *Spanish Indies*, and leave Us answerable
 for all those Calamities that shall ensue upon it: which as yet, by
 God's Providence, may be timely prevented. But he that fills the raging
 of the Sea, will undoubtedly set Bounds to this overflowing Greatness; having
 now, (as an Earnest of that Mercy) put it into the hearts of our Superi-
 ours to provide seasonably for the Common safety, and in proportion
 also to the Exigence of the Affair; knowing very well, that things of
 this Nature are not to be done by halves.

We have to do with a Nation of a large Territory; abounding in Men, and Money;
 their Dominion is grown so Absolute, that no man there can call any thing his own, if
 the Court says Nay to't. So that the Sober and Industrious Part are only slaves to the
 Lusts, and Ambition of the Military. In this Condition of Servitude, they feel already
 what their Neighbours fear, and with as well to any Opportunity, either of a wadding, or
 of Casting off the Yoke: which will easily be given by a Conjunction of *England* and *Hol-
 land* at Sea: and almost infallibly produce these Effects. First; It will draw off the Naval
 Force of *France* from *Sicily*, *America*, and elsewhere, to attend this Expedition. Second-
 ly, The Diversion will be an ease to the *Empire*, and the *Confederates*, from whence
 more Troops must be drawn to encounter this Difficulty, than the French can well spare.
 Thirdly, It will not only encourage those Princes, and States that are already engag'd,
 but likewise keep in Awe those that are dissatisfied, and confirm those that waver.

Tis true, this War must needs be prodigious expense; but then in probability it will
 be short. And in Cases of this Quality, people must do as in a Storm at Sea, rather throw
 part of the Lading over-board, than Founder the Vessel. I do not speak This, as suppos-
 ing any Difficulty in the Case; for the very contemplation of it has put fire into the
 veins of every true *Englishman*; and they are moved, as by a sacred impulse, to the Ne-
 cessary, and the only means of their Preservation. And that which crows our hopes, is that
 these generous Inclinations are only ready to execute what the wisdom of their Superi-
 ours shall find reasonable to Command. I need not tell you how zealous the People of
England are of their Religion, and Liberties; to what degree they have contended, even
 for the shadow of these Interests; nor how much blood, and Treasure they have spent
 upon the Quarrel. Could any impossible work so much; and can any man imagine that
 they will be now less sensible, when they see before their eyes a manifest Plot upon their
 Religion, their Liberties invaded; their Traffique interrupted; the Honour, and the
 very Being of their Country at stake; their Wives and Children expos'd to Beggary and
 Scarcity; and in Conclusion, The Privileges of a Free-born *Englishman* Exchanged for the
 Vassalage of *France*?

FINIS.